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Abstract—Data hosted in a cloud environment can be subject
to attacks from a higher privileged adversary, such as a malicious
or compromised cloud provider. To provide confidentiality and
integrity even in the presence of such an adversary, a number of
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been developed. A
TEE aims to protect data and code within its environment against
high privileged adversaries, such as a malicious operating system
or hypervisor.
While mechanisms exist to attest a TEE’s integrity at load time
[3], there are no mechanisms to attest its integrity at runtime.
Additionally, work also exists that discusses mechanisms to verify
the runtime integrity of programs and system components. How-
ever, those verification mechanisms are themselves not protected
against attacks from a high privileged adversary. It is therefore
desirable to combine the protection mechanisms of TEEs with
the ability of application runtime integrity verification.
In this paper, we present Scanclave, a lightweight design which
achieves three design goals: Trustworthiness of the verifier, a
minimal trusted software stack and the possibility to access an
application’s memory from a TEE. Having achieved our goals,
we are able to verify the runtime integrity of applications even
in the presence of a high privileged adversary.
We refrain from discussing which properties define the runtime
integrity of an application, as different applications will require
different verification methods. Instead, we show how Scanclave
enables a remote verifier to determine the runtime integrity
of an application. Afterwards, we perform a security analysis
for the different steps of our design. Additionally, we discuss
different enclave implementations that might be used for the
implementation of Scanclave.
Index Terms—Trusted Execution Environments, Runtime In-
tegrity, Trusted Computing, Attestation
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has been on the rise over the last years.
This technology allows organizations to outsource their infras-
tructure and its management to a third party, and to focus on
other tasks.
However, by outsourcing the infrastructure, cloud customers
are required to trust the cloud provider not to violate the con-
fidentiality or integrity of their data. A malicious provider is
trivially able to obtain critical information from its customers,
or even to manipulate data and processes. This is one of
the reasons for the deployment of multiple Trusted Execution
Environments (TEEs).
A TEE is an isolated environment which aims to protect
executions within its environment against high privileged
adversaries. While software TEEs solely rely on software
mechanisms for protection, hardware TEEs make use of ad-
ditional hardware mechanisms to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of code and data within the environment. The
approach of hardware TEEs minimizes the entities the cloud
customer has to trust to a single one: the hardware vendor.
Most TEEs provide the possibility to attest the integrity
of their components at load time [3]. Before the TEE is
loaded, all required components can be measured, for example
by hashing them. Those measurements can be compared
with previous measurements, which are known to reflect a
trustworthy state of the components. If all hashes are equal
to previous measurements, it can be concluded that the TEE
was loaded by using only trustworthy components, and was
therefore in a trustworthy state at load time.
However, TEEs lack mechanisms to verify the runtime
integrity of the environment. Once the TEE - or any other
application - is running, its memory is subject to change, for
example by allocating memory, or by changing variables. At
runtime, the state of the application is therefore different from
its state at load time. Runtime integrity verification is required
to determine if this new state is still trustworthy, or if it has
been maliciously modified.
Work exists that discusses how the runtime integrity of
applications [11], [17] and system components [22] can be ver-
ified. Unfortunately, those evaluation mechanisms themselves
are not protected against a higher privileged adversary. We
eliminate this threat by running the evaluation mechanisms in
a TEE.
In this work, we present Scanclave, an architecture which
allows us to achieve the following goals:
1) Trustworthiness of the verifier
Scanclave needs to be trustworthy. This trustworthiness
can not be affected by an adversary, even if he has high
privileges on the system.
2) Minimal trusted software stack
The code that needs to be trusted should be reduced
to a minimum. This will reduce the attack surface and
simplify examination of the code.
3) Accessing an application’s memory from a TEE
Scanclave needs to be able to access an application’s
memory at runtime. This is necessary to perform the
runtime integrity measurements.
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II. ATTACKER MODEL
In this section, we introduce our attacker model and its ca-
pabilities. The goal of the attacker is to modify an application
at runtime without being detected.
We consider an attacker who is able to gain control over an
application after it has been correctly loaded, for example by
making use of a vulnerability. Having gained control over the
application, he is able to perform arbitrary modifications to it,
such as modifying return statements or changing code.
We also consider an attacker who is in control of the high
privileged software hosting the TEE, such as the Operating
System (OS). The attacker is able to observe the TEE with
any methods available to the OS, for example by influencing
its scheduling or by monitoring its network traffic. He can
also read and modify all memory regions and processes that
are not protected by the TEE. However, the attacker is not
able to break any cryptographic primitives or to perform any
zero-day attacks on the TEE. The TEE is therefore the only
component on the system that can be trusted.
III. DESIGN
Scanclave allows a remote party to verify the runtime
integrity of applications, even in the presence of a high
privileged adversary. In this section, we start with explaining
how we achieve our goals. Afterwards, we describe the design
of Scanclave and discuss which steps have to be taken by a
remote verifier to perform runtime integrity verification of an
application.
To achieve our first goal, trustworthiness, we embed Scan-
clave in a TEE. This will protect Scanclave against higher
privileged adversaries.
To achieve our second goal, a minimal trusted software
stack, we use enclaves as TEE for the implementation of
Scanclave. An example for such an enclave is Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [9]. The goal of enclaves is to
allow an application in user space to create an area which is
protected against software running on higher privilege levels.
This protected area is called the enclave.
The enclave application is split up in the untrusted Host
Application (HA) and the trusted enclave. The HA can call
functions in the enclave by using specified entry points.
Also the enclave can call functions in the HA, for example
to perform network communication. Other than using the
specified entry points, the HA and high privileged software
have no possibility to access or modify an enclave’s memory.
This will protect the enclave even against a high privileged
adversary.
The trusted software stack of enclaves only consists of the
code running directly in one particular enclave. We move
only the code required for verification and attestation into the
enclave. All operations that can be performed by untrusted
code, such as network communication, are placed outside of
the TEE. Those operations have to make use of protection
mechanisms such as encryption to ensure their confidentiality
and integrity.
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Fig. 1. The HA is used to launch the TA. This causes Scanclave and the
TA to share the same address space, and allows Scanclave to access the TA’s
memory.
While the HA has no possibility to access the enclave’s
memory, the enclave is able to access the memory of its HA.
When the application to be verified, the Target Application
(TA), is running within the HA, the enclave will be able to
access the TA’s memory, and to verify its runtime integrity.
This allows us to achieve the goal of accessing an application’s
memory from a TEE.
Once we enabled Scanclave to verify the integrity of the
TA, we can apply a number of verification methods. Work on
verification methods that ensure runtime integrity of applica-
tions already exists [1], [11], [17], and will therefore not be
discussed in this work. Instead, we will focus on the technical
difficulties when trying to verify the TA from an enclave.
Figure 1 shows an overview of Scanclave’s architecture and
its setup. The shaded area is protected by the enclave. First,
the HA will hand over control to Scanclave for initialization.
In this step, the Scanclave instance creates a unique private
key, which will be used to sign verification reports.
The private key can not be shipped with Scanclave, as high
privileged software is able to inspect all components required
to launch the enclave [9]. While the integrity of the compo-
nents can be guaranteed by remote attestation protocols, their
confidentiality can be violated by a high privileged adversary
[3]. Secrets like private keys will only be protected within the
running enclave, or in a secure storage only accessible to the
enclave.
Once the key has been created, its matching public key
will be sent to the remote verifier (1a). As noted previously,
Scanclave does not include functionality to perform network
communication. It therefore has to rely on the HA and the
underlying OS for communication with the remote verifier.
This communication might be monitored and modified by an
attacker. Therefore, communication between Scanclave and the
remote verifier needs to be encrypted and its integrity has to be
protected. It also must be ensured that the secure connection
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Fig. 2. A remote verifier can now request Scanclave to verify the runtime
integrity of the TA. This can be either done by accessing the TA directly, or
by using a debug bridge. The results of the verification will be signed and
sent to the verifier.
is only terminated within the enclave, and not in the HA.
The public key of the remote verifier can be shipped
with Scanclave to help establishing a secure communication
channel. Compared to the private key, the public key can
be shipped with Scanclave, as only its integrity needs to be
ensured. Knauth et al. [23] show how attestation of the enclave
can be combined with the establishment of a secure channel.
After having created the private key and sending the public
key to the remote verifier, Scanclave will save the private
key in a secure storage only accessible to the particular
Scanclave instance (2). At future launches, the private key
can be retrieved from the secure storage (1b). Using a secure
storage ensures that the key will never leave the protected
area. We leave it up to the enclave implementation how the
secure storage is implemented, and only require guarantees
that only the enclave can access the storage. If the enclave
implementation does not provide a secure storage, a new
private key can be created each time Scanclave is launched.
After the initialization phase, Scanclave will hand control
back to the HA, which will launch the TA (3). This step does
not require any modification of the TA. As the TA is launched
by the HA, they will share the same address space together
with Scanclave. Still, the security mechanisms of the enclave
ensure that the memory of Scanclave can not be accessed from
the untrusted TA or HA.
Figure 2 shows the verification process with Scanclave.
Whenever verification of the TA is required, the remote verifier
sends a nonce to Scanclave (4). Scanclave will then scan the
TA’s address space and perform all checks required to verify
the integrity of the TA (5a).
On systems which allow applications to access the memory
of other applications, Scanclave might also be used to verify
an external TA. To access an external TA’s memory, Scanclave
can attach itself to the external application by creating a debug
bridge (5b). Such a bridge can be created for example by using
ptrace [16] on Linux or the ReadProcessMemory [26]
function on Windows.
We use Scanclave only to verify the TA, but not the HA.
Verification of the HA is not required, as it is only used to
host Scanclave and to launch the TA.
After gathering the verification results and creating a ver-
ification report, the report is signed with the unique private
key of the Scanclave instance. The signed report will be sent
to the remote verifier (6). This allows the remote verifier in
possession of the public key to verify that the report was
created by the correct Scanclave instance. To defend against
replay attacks, the nonce sent in Step (4) is included in the
report. Steps (4) to (6) can be repeated whenever verification
is desired.
If the verification report shows that the TA is not in a
trustworthy state, the remote verifier can restore the trust-
worthy state of the TA with the help of Scanclave. One
approach would be to try to determine all modifications to
the TA, and to restore its original state. However, it can be
challenging to restore all malicious modifications to the TA.
Instead, Scanclave instructs the HA to terminate the TA, and
to launch it again in a clean state.
An alternative approach to our design would be to run
the whole TA in the enclave. In this scenario, an attacker
compromising the TA would imply a compromise of the
enclave. Software running in the enclave could therefore not
be trusted anymore. This violation would be impossible to
detect with standard attestation techniques for TEEs, as they
only verify load time integrity. By using Scanclave, an attacker
gaining control over the TA can be detected by runtime
integrity verification. The confidentiality and the integrity of
Scanclave are protected against a higher privileged attacker,
and the confidentiality of the TA is assured by Scanclave.
IV. DISCUSSION
This section discusses how an adversary might try to influ-
ence the different steps of Scanclave’s verification process.
When transferring the public key to the remote verifier
after initialization in Step (1a), an adversary might try to
impersonate Scanclave, or to exchange Scanclave’s public key
with its own. This would allow the adversary to create arbitrary
verification reports in the name of Scanclave. It is therefore
important to ensure the remote verifier is communicating with
a valid Scanclave instance, and to ensure the integrity of the
communication.
To avoid an adversary impersonating a Scanclave instance,
the remote verifier uses a remote attestation protocol to ensure
he is communicating with a valid Scanclave instance [3]. This
also allows to detect a high privileged adversary that prevents
Scanclave from launching. To ensure that an adversary is not
able to modify the public key sent to the remote verifier, the
secure communication channel is only terminated within the
enclave [23]. The same mechanisms also ensure the integrity
of the nonce sent to Scanclave in Step (4). The verification
report sent in Step (6) is additionally signed with Scanclave’s
private key.
Steps (1b) and (2), reading and writing the private key
from and to the secure storage, are performed within the
protected area. We do rely on the enclave implementation to
protect accesses from the enclave to the secure storage against
adversaries.
In Step (3), the HA launches the TA. An adversary could try
to prevent the launch, or to launch a modified version of the
TA. If the TA is not launched, it will be detected by Scanclave
as it will not be able to find the TA in its address space. For
external TAs, Scanclave will detect that it is not able to build
a debug bridge to the TA. If the TA has been modified, this
will be detected by the verification mechanisms of Scanclave.
Before the verification process in Steps (5a) and (5b), an
adversary might try to read or modify the TA’s memory,
or try to manipulate the runtime verification performed by
Scanclave. Reading the TA’s memory will be possible, as our
design does not provide the TA with confidentiality. In case
confidentiality is required for the TA, a second enclave for
handling confidential data can be hosted. Unlike reading the
TA’s memory, modification of the TA will be detected by the
runtime verification. An attacker might therefore try to avoid
detection through the verification process. For doing so, an
attacker has two possibilities:
Causing undetectable changes. Our approach provides a
general design for performing runtime verification. An attacker
trying to avoid being detected by the verification process could
try to only apply modifications to the TA that can not be
detected. It is therefore important to choose a verification
method that is able to detect different kinds of modifications,
or to combine multiple methods. We leave it up to future work
to analyze and compare existing verification methods.
Restoring integrity before verification. Another method
to avoid detection by Scanclave would be to restore the
original state of the TA before runtime integrity verification
is performed. To find out when the verification is performed,
the attacker could analyze the enclave’s behavior, such as its
memory access patterns or network traffic. Having determined
the moment of the verification, the attacker could momentarily
restore the TA’s integrity to ensure a successful verification.
It is also important to keep in mind that accesses from the
enclave to the TA’s memory are not protected as they are
performed on untrusted memory regions. An attacker could try
to redirect Scanclave’s verification memory accesses to other
memory regions, in which an unmodified copy of the TA is
stored.
To avoid an adversary finding out the moment of the
verification, it is important not to leak any information of the
enclave’s behavior, such as memory or cache access patterns.
Previous work covers how software can protect itself against
such leakage [6], [12], [32], [34], [35].
An adversary might also monitor the network traffic and
wait for the remote verifier to send the nonce in Step (4).
He could then conclude that Step (5), the verification, will
start shortly. To avoid that the timing of Step (5) can be
determined by observing Step (4), Scanclave performs the
verification independently of Step (4). Instead, Step (4) is
performed within a regular interval, which is regularly changed
to avoid predictability. If verification has been performed and
a new nonce was received, the current verification report is
sent to the remote verifier, using the new nonce.
To sum up, all steps in our process are protected against
an adversary monitoring the network traffic as well as against
adversaries trying to modify the HA, TA, or Scanclave.
V. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we discuss the state of the art in enclave
implementations in the industry and in academia. We analyze
their suitability for our approach as well as their limitations.
Among all enclave TEEs, Intel SGX is probably the most
widely known. One reason for this is that it was also one of the
first TEEs, proposed in 2015. Additionally, the fact that it is the
only enclave TEE available on the x86 architecture helps the
publicity of SGX. Meanwhile, even the first cloud providers
allow customers to use SGX [21], [28]. Still, the spread of
SGX is limited by various factors. One of them is that the
underlying BIOS needs to support SGX [20]. Until recently, to
make use of an SGX implementation with all available security
guarantees, a business relationship with Intel was required.
This step was necessary to make use of the attestation process
required to launch enclaves [3]. After this requirement has
received criticism in the past [9], Intel recently announced to
allow attestation also for third parties [30].
Various attacks on SGX have been made public. While some
analyze the memory access pattern of the enclave to extract
secrets [38], [39], others are able to reconstruct secrets via a
caching side-channel [8], [15], [37].
To develop an enclave that is protected against side-
channel attacks, Costan et al. propose Sanctum [10]. The
basic architectures of SGX and Sanctum are very comparable.
By isolating an enclave’s cache within the system’s cache
hierarchy, Sanctum additionally protects against the caching
side-channel. It also protects against attacks that analyze
an enclave’s memory access pattern by deploying a page-
coloring-based cache partitioning scheme.
Sanctum was designed as an extension to the RISC-V
architecture and is open source. Open sourcing the security
mechanisms allows to investigate the mechanisms which en-
sure the trustworthiness of the enclave. The main limitation of
Sanctum is that it is making use of a non-standard hardware
extension.
For this reason, the Keystone enclave was introduced in
2018. Similar to Sanctum, Keystone is also built on the RISC-
V architecture and open source. Additionally, one of its main
goals is to enforce memory isolation only by using standard
RISC-V primitives. This reduces the barriers when adopting
Keystone. Keystone also has the advantage that it can be run in
a Virtual Machine (VM), which allows to evaluate and develop
enclaves without needing specific hardware.
In Table I, we give an overview of the differences between
SGX, Sanctum and Keystone. Considering the limitations of
SGX, and the hardware requirements of Sanctum, we expect
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SGX, SANCTUM AND KEYSTONE
SGX Sanctum Keystone
Architecture x86 RISC-V RISC-V
Open source No Yes Yes
Attestation infrastructure required Yes No No
Available in cloud Yes No No
Memory access pattern protection No Yes In Progress
Caching side-channels protection No Yes In Progress
Hardware extensions required No Yes No
that an implementation of Scanclave on Keystone would be
the most promising.
VI. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any
work that covers application runtime integrity verification from
enclaves. We will therefore start with discussing work that also
makes use of the possibility to access the HA’s memory from
the enclave. We will continue with work that was designed to
verify system integrity with the help of TEEs.
Schwarz et al. [31] presented malware running in an SGX
enclave. As an enclave is able to access the memory of its
HA, they built a malicious enclave which impersonates its
HA. First, they use a technique based on Intel TSX [19] to
look for code fragments in the HA’s memory that can be
used to perform Return Oriented Programming (ROP) attacks
[33]. Having discovered interesting code fragments, they use
a technique dubbed SGX-ROP to execute arbitrary code in the
HA.
Their attacker model greatly differs from ours, as they
assume a malicious enclave, and a benign HA as well as
benign high privileged software. In contrast, Scanclave is de-
signed to protect a benign TA against malicious high privileged
software with the help of a trusted enclave. Still, their work
is relevant for the implementation of verification mechanisms
in Scanclave as it for example discusses techniques to scan a
HA’s address space from an enclave.
ARM TrustZone (TZ) [5] splits the whole system in a secure
and a normal world. While the normal world is not able to
access the secure world, the secure world is given full control
over the normal world. Xinyang and Jaeger [13], and Azab
et al. [7] make use of this property and add methods to the
secure world to protect the integrity of a kernel running in the
normal world.
TZ was designed with a focus on embedded systems. It is
difficult to apply it in our scenario as it only provides one
secure world on each system. Different users would all have
to run their verification mechanisms in the same secure world.
This would require to trust the code of other users. With
enclaves, each Scanclave instance is provided with its own
TEE, isolated from other Scanclave instances. Additionally,
code in the secure world receives excessive privileges. A cloud
provider will want to avoid granting those privileges to a
customer. With enclaves, the user’s verification software is
running with lower privileges, protecting the system against
a possible malicious cloud user.
Zhang et al. [40] proposed to make use of a secure
coprocessor for integrity verification. Such a coprocessor is
running independently from the processor on the system, and
is therefore unaffected by a compromise of the system. Petroni
et al. [27] implemented a system which makes use of a secure
coprocessor, and used it to monitor the integrity of the host
kernel.
Those mechanisms were designed for a different use case,
namely for administrators to verify their systems. This differs
from our approach, which is designed for users wanting to
protect their applications against a high privileged adversary.
Therefore, they have the same limitations in our use case as
TZ: only one TEE exists, and the software in the TEE receives
extensive privileges.
The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [36] is an industry
standard for a micro controller designed to help detecting mod-
ifications of a system. By creating a hash of every component
in the boot chain and storing the hash in the TPM, changes to
the boot chain can be detected [25]. However, this approach
suffers from the problem that the hashes change each time a
component in the boot chain is updated. Secure boot [4] tries
to avoid this problem by verifying the signature of components
instead of their hashes.
Both methods are designed to verify the boot process rather
than applications. Infrastructure also exists to extend the boot
chain to the application layer [29]. However, this infrastructure
only measures the load time integrity of applications, and
requires a benign OS, which we do not assume in our design.
The TPM can also be used to establish a dynamic root
of trust, which allows to perform attestation after the system
was booted. To perform such an attestation, Flickr [24] makes
use of Intel TXT [14] or AMD SVM [2] technology. Flickr
calculates hashes of critical system components and stores
them in the TPM, where they can be used for attestation with
an external entity.
This approach requires cooperation of high privileged soft-
ware to execute the CPU instructions required to perform
the dynamic attestation. During the attestation phase, actions
that could interfere with this process, such as debugging and
interrupts, are disabled. This might affect other computations,
which is critical in cloud environments. Additionally, most
systems are equipped with only one TPM. To store hashes
for different users, multiple TPMs or virtualization would be
required. For those reasons, TXT in cloud environments is
mostly used to verify the integrity of system components such
as the BIOS or the Hypervisor (HV) [18]. Our design enables a
user to perform application verification without requiring high
privileged software, and without affecting other computations
on the system.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we presented the design of Scanclave. Our
design achieves three main goals: Trustworthiness of the
verifier, a minimal trusted software stack and the ability to
access an application’s memory from a TEE. Achieving all
three goals, we are able to provide integrity in environments
in which higher privileged software can not be trusted, such
as cloud environments.
Based on our design, we showed which steps are necessary
for a remote verifier to perform application runtime integrity
verification. Additionally, we discussed how we protect Scan-
clave against different adversaries in every step of the process.
Our contribution is completed with a comparison of enclave
implementations that could be used for the implementation of
Scanclave.
In future work, we plan to use the Scanclave architecture
to develop new and effective verification techniques that can
determine the runtime integrity of various types of applica-
tions. One possible scenario would be to use a VM as TA.
Scanclave would then be able to measure the integrity of the
VM’s kernel, as for example as described in [22].
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